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This paper investigates, whether including more corporate governance provisions or adding takeover defenses at annual shareholder meetings has a material impact on bond yield spreads. The analysis focuses on close call votes at annual shareholder meetings and uses a regression discontinuity design. This provides a clean estimate that accounts for the market expectations which form prior to the voting event and can therefore deliver more accurate estimates. I found that the bond yield spread increases by 0.29 percentage points if a governance proposal is passed but decreases by -1.77 percentage points if a takeover defense is added, after the voting percentage has surpassed the required threshold.
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Regression discontinuity Corporate governance Takeover defenses
