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Resumo(s)
This paper uses Public Good Games conducted in rural Rwanda to analyze the
impact of rewards and penalties on the level of cooperation. Furthermore, this work
elaborates whether the decisions to punish and reward are triggered equally. The results
provide evidence, that the possibilities of rewarding and punishing a partner successfully
increase cooperation levels. Moreover, evidence suggests, that reward and punishment
decisions are based on di↵erent motivations. Sanctioning shows signs of being motivated
by outcome preferences and perceived intentionality of a participant’s action. Results
for reward suggest, that reciprocity based on intentionality and kindness of an action is
the significant driver.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Public good games Rwanda Field experiment Inequity aversion Reciprocity Punishment Reward
