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Qualified majority versus unanimity: making decisions easier?
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In this paper, we will investigate if there is the counterintuitive possibility that decisions under unanimity in the Council of the European Union may result in approval of proposals of the Commission with higher simplicity when compared to the voting system of qualified majority. The focus will be not only on the underlying interpretation of the abstention, but also on the quorum required to allow formal voting to take place. Moreover, bearing in mind different interpretations of abstention, we will also find the necessary proportion of favorable actual voters for each level of participation to ensure that the concepts of Condorcet Consistency and Representation are respected.
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European Union Collective decision making Abstention Condorcet consistency