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This paper examines the economic dynamics of debt restructuring, focusing on the in centives behind defaults and the evolution of restructuring mechanisms. Using a canonical
model of sovereign default solved quantitatively, I analyze the trade-offs sovereigns face
between default and austerity. Empirical evidence from Argentina, Greece, and Zambia
restructurings illustrates the changing nature of sovereign debt negotiation. I show that
higher interest rates can lower the strategic default debt-to-GDP threshold level by as much
as 15%. I also analyze empirically the vanishing impact of sovereign-debt restructuring
on debt-to-GDP levels and real consumption, both reverting to pre-crisis levels within 5-7
years on average.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Sovereign debt Debt restructuring Default risk Macroeconomic policy
