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This paper investigates how German football clubs circumvent the '50+1 rule' by
decoupling voting rights from economic ownership, to attract majority investors. It introduces
a novel categorisation of clubs and analyses the financial and sporting impact of majority
investors using panel data (2017/18-2022/23). The results show that clubs circumventing the
rule experience lower profitability and sporting performance, with no significant revenue
advantage, challenging assumptions about investor benefits. The study highlights the
unintended consequences of rule circumvention and provides actionable recommendations,
urging either stricter enforcement or reform of the rule to enhance Bundesliga governance and
ensure sustainable financial and sporting competitiveness.
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Football governance German first and second Bundesliga Ownership structure Majority investors Financial performance Sporting performance 50+1 rule
