| Nome: | Descrição: | Tamanho: | Formato: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 999.2 KB | Adobe PDF |
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
A questão que alumia o presente trabalho e define o seu objeto é a de saber se no processo de tomada de decisão judicial, compreendida como uma decisão qualificada e produto da mente de um sujeito particular - o juiz – esta se encontra sujeita à influencia e ao efeito de vieses cognitivos e se, na afirmativa, heurísticas, intuições, sentimentos e insights marcam cada etapa do processo decisório e se refletem no produto final.
Reconhecendo-se que pouco se encontra escrito sobre o tema na literatura nacional, qualquer proposta de resposta há-de assentar na análise do processo de tomada de decisão numa perspetiva multidisciplinar, para o que se comparam os modelos da racionalidade da Economia Comportamental, esgrimem-se argumentos de equilíbrio entre Razão e Emoção ensaiados pelas Neurociências e em muito desbravados, entre nós, por António Damásio. A partir dos estudos da Psicologia Comportamental Cognitiva, mais precisamente da teoria da dissonância, analisamos que vieses cognitivos apresentam maior potencial para comprometer, de forma direta ou implícita, as decisões judiciais partindo do sistema dual de pensamento, ensinado por Kahneman.
Sem esquecer que o juiz é um homem, moldado por todas as suas circunstâncias de vida que acumula no reservatório que é a sua mente e ainda pelas que foram ancestralmente transmitidas, discorremos sobre a identidade de valores como a imparcialidade e a neutralidade, indagando sobre a relação semântica e linguística que entre ambos intercede.
Procurando-se também compreender o papel da fundamentação das decisões judiciais enquanto mecanismo de salvaguarda do sistema num Estado de Direito Democrático, confrontamos a indispensável objetividade da fundamentação com a interferência de vieses nos momentos de apreciação da prova e ao seu reflexo nas garantias de imparcialidade.
Após a análise particular de vieses que interagem no processo de tomada de decisão judicial singular e
coletiva e do momento processual onde é passível estabelecer a sua marcação, anotamos, em jeito de
conclusão e de forma muito breve, mecanismos para deteção de potencial bias, que enquanto propostas de previsão e de resolução, dada a respetiva amplitude, merecerão ulterior abordagem.
The question that illuminates the present work and defines its object is to know whether in the judicial decision-making process, considered a qualified decision and product of the mind of a particular subject - the judge - is subject to the influence and effect of cognitive biases and whether, if true, heuristics, intuitions, feelings and insights mark each stage of the decision-making process and are reflected in the final product. Recognizing that little is written on the subject in the national literature, any proposed answer must be based on the analysis of the decision-making process through a multidisciplinary perspective, for which the models of rationality of Behavioural Economics are compared, the arguments of balance between Reason and Emotion tested by the Neurosciences and much explored, among others, by António Damásio. Through the studies of Cognitive Behavioural Psychology, more precisely through the theory of cognitive dissonance, we analyse that cognitive biases have greater potential to compromise, directly or implicitly, judicial decisions, based on the dual system of thought, explored by Kahneman. Without forgetting that the judge is a man, shaped by all the circumstances of life that he has experienced and accumulates in the reservoir that is his mind and of those that were ancestrally transmitted to him, we discuss the identity of values such as impartiality and neutrality, inquiring about the semantic and linguistic relationship that intercedes between them. Also seeking to understand the role of the reasoning of judicial decisions as a mechanism to safeguard the system in a Democratic State of Law, we confront the indispensable objectivity of the reasoning with the interference of biases in the moments of assessment of evidence and its reflection on the guarantees of impartiality. After the analysis of biases that interact in the process of singular and collective judicial decision-making and the procedural moment where it is possible to establish their marking, we rehearse, by way of conclusion, some mechanisms of prediction and resolution that would justify, given their amplitude, a simple approach in another work.
The question that illuminates the present work and defines its object is to know whether in the judicial decision-making process, considered a qualified decision and product of the mind of a particular subject - the judge - is subject to the influence and effect of cognitive biases and whether, if true, heuristics, intuitions, feelings and insights mark each stage of the decision-making process and are reflected in the final product. Recognizing that little is written on the subject in the national literature, any proposed answer must be based on the analysis of the decision-making process through a multidisciplinary perspective, for which the models of rationality of Behavioural Economics are compared, the arguments of balance between Reason and Emotion tested by the Neurosciences and much explored, among others, by António Damásio. Through the studies of Cognitive Behavioural Psychology, more precisely through the theory of cognitive dissonance, we analyse that cognitive biases have greater potential to compromise, directly or implicitly, judicial decisions, based on the dual system of thought, explored by Kahneman. Without forgetting that the judge is a man, shaped by all the circumstances of life that he has experienced and accumulates in the reservoir that is his mind and of those that were ancestrally transmitted to him, we discuss the identity of values such as impartiality and neutrality, inquiring about the semantic and linguistic relationship that intercedes between them. Also seeking to understand the role of the reasoning of judicial decisions as a mechanism to safeguard the system in a Democratic State of Law, we confront the indispensable objectivity of the reasoning with the interference of biases in the moments of assessment of evidence and its reflection on the guarantees of impartiality. After the analysis of biases that interact in the process of singular and collective judicial decision-making and the procedural moment where it is possible to establish their marking, we rehearse, by way of conclusion, some mechanisms of prediction and resolution that would justify, given their amplitude, a simple approach in another work.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Tomada de decisão judicial Subjetividade Razão e Emoção Imparcialidade Neutralidade Colegialidade Psicologia Comportamental Cognitiva Teorias do Duplo Processo Teoria da Dissonância Cognitiva Vieses Cognitivos Heurísticas Fundamentação da decisão Judicial decision-makin Subjectivity Reason and Emotion Impartiality Neutrality Collegiality Cognitive Behavioural Psychology Theories of the Double Process Cognitive Dissonance Theory. Cognitive biases Heuristics Grounds for the decision
