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The impact of executive substitution on executive pay: internal versus external hires - the United States market perspective
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This research examines the dynamics of executive pay during turnover events in four different
regions. It explores executive compensation practices in France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. By distinguishing between internal and external hires, we
uncover patterns and implications of compensation adjustments. Our findings reveal
inconsistent results for each market, highlighting the effects of different corporate governance
practices across regions that have a distinct impact on CEO recruitment and executive
compensation. Contrary to the prior literature, we find that compensation levels of CEO
successors are not significantly driven by the previous employment relationship in the US,
France, and the UK. However, our analysis of German firms shows that internal CEO
successors earn significantly more than external ones. By identifying different determinants of
CEO succession, the research contributes to the broader discourse on executive compensation
and provides actionable insights for boards and stakeholders.
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Ceo compensation Ceo turnover Succession risks Corporate governance