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Too good to resist? How can public and private cartel enforcement coexist
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Resumo(s)
The decrease in cartel leniency applicants following the EU 2014 Damages Directive led to
a debate on the conflicts between public and private enforcement. With the intent of inves tigating this conflict, a theoretical model, which includes the possibility of cartel detection
originating from outside a Leniency Program, was established. According to the model, this
conflict may be overcome under a sufficiently high level of legal protection of immunity
receivers. It is also shown that damages compensation under private enforcement may even
serve as a counterbalance to generous leniency policies. The right to compensation and the
well-functioning of a Leniency Program may, in the end, be different yet complementary.
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Palavras-chave
Industrial economics Game yheory Competition economics Leniency program