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Anarquia, autonomia e jurisprudência
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Esta dissertação, em primeiro lugar, pretende ser mais um esforço para “absolver” o conceito de anarquia. Um segundo aspecto prende-se com o trabalho desenvolvido por Ruth Kinna no âmbito da constitucionalização anarquista, pelo que se procura a articulação possível entre o conceito de anarquia, de autonomia e de jurisprudência. Procura-se em primeiro lugar separar o conceito de anomia do conceito de anarquia, pela via etimológica, defendendo que anarquia corresponde a um tipo de ordem social e não a atributos habitualmente associados à desordem ou à anomia. Num segundo momento procura-se a definição de autonomia como geneticamente ligada à anarquia e como a verdadeira resposta à anomia. Num primeiro ponto, buscando a autonomia no pensamento estóico dada a sua ligação ao pensamento anarquista evidenciada por Kropotkin, num outro ponto, também através de Kropotkin, a partir de uma crítica feita por este à ética kantiana. Por último, procura-se a relação da ordem anarquista, ou da organização social que procura, com a lei, na medida em que uma comunidade anarquista e a sua constitucionalização exigirão sempre mecanismos legais, e não só, que promovam a não dominação e anulem a autoridade de uns sobre outros. Neste sentido, e recorrendo particularmente a Kelsen, é necessário saber se o direito positivo serve esse propósito ou se bastará à ordem social a espontaneidade que emanará da solidariedade e da justiça que, de acordo com alguns anarquistas, serão características naturais. Conclui-se a “absolvição” com a esperança de que o contributo da crítica anarquista para o futuro da democracia continue inestimável.
This dissertation, in the first place, is intended as another effort to "absolve" the concept of anarchy. A second aspect is predicated on the work developed by Ruth Kinna in the context of anarchist constitutionalising, by which the possible articulation between the concepts of anarchy, autonomy and jurisprudence is sought. In the first place, we seek to separate the concept of anomie from that of anarchy, through etymology, arguing that anarchy corresponds to a type of social order and not to attributes usually associated with disorder or anomie. In a second moment, the definition of autonomy is sought as genetically linked to anarchy and as the true answer to anomie. At a first point, autonomy is sought in Stoic thought given its link to anarchist thought as evidenced by Kropotkin; at another point, also through Kropotkin, from a critique of Kantian ethics. Finally, the relationship between the anarchist order, or the social organisation it seeks, and the law is sought, insofar as an anarchist community and its constitutionalising will always demand legal mechanisms, and not only these, which promote non-domination and annul the authority of some over others. In this sense, and resorting particularly to Kelsen, it is necessary to know whether positive law serves this purpose or whether the spontaneity emanating from solidarity and justice, which, according to some anarchists, are natural characteristics, will suffice for the social order. We conclude the absolution with the hope that the contribution of anarchist critique to the future of democracy remains invaluable.
This dissertation, in the first place, is intended as another effort to "absolve" the concept of anarchy. A second aspect is predicated on the work developed by Ruth Kinna in the context of anarchist constitutionalising, by which the possible articulation between the concepts of anarchy, autonomy and jurisprudence is sought. In the first place, we seek to separate the concept of anomie from that of anarchy, through etymology, arguing that anarchy corresponds to a type of social order and not to attributes usually associated with disorder or anomie. In a second moment, the definition of autonomy is sought as genetically linked to anarchy and as the true answer to anomie. At a first point, autonomy is sought in Stoic thought given its link to anarchist thought as evidenced by Kropotkin; at another point, also through Kropotkin, from a critique of Kantian ethics. Finally, the relationship between the anarchist order, or the social organisation it seeks, and the law is sought, insofar as an anarchist community and its constitutionalising will always demand legal mechanisms, and not only these, which promote non-domination and annul the authority of some over others. In this sense, and resorting particularly to Kelsen, it is necessary to know whether positive law serves this purpose or whether the spontaneity emanating from solidarity and justice, which, according to some anarchists, are natural characteristics, will suffice for the social order. We conclude the absolution with the hope that the contribution of anarchist critique to the future of democracy remains invaluable.
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Palavras-chave
Anomia Anarquia Autonomia Kropotkin Kelsen Kina Jurisprudência Direito positivo Positivismo jurídico Lei Autoridade Estado Anomie Anarchy Autonomy Jurisprudence Positive law Legal positivism Law Authority State