A carregar...
Publicação
Deixar a Religião como está: Verdade, Crença e Imaginação
| Nome: | Descrição: | Tamanho: | Formato: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 281.22 KB | Adobe PDF |
Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
A filosofia da religião wittgensteiniana contemporânea tem como abordagem paradigmática o tratamento de crenças e práticas religiosas como jogos de linguagem relativamente isolados. Uma das limitações centrais desta abordagem é a dificuldade na compreensão do valor e importância da religião no contexto ampliado da vida de seu praticante, no chamado ‘problema da importância’ da crença religiosa. Na sequência de uma apresentação desta problemática, proporei que os elementos para a sua resolução podem ser encontrados na própria tradição wittgensteiniana e de autores para ela relevantes. Discutirei, em primeiro lugar, o pensamento de G. E. M. Anscombe, que propõe uma distinção entre perspetivas ‘interna’ e ‘externa’ à crença religiosa, e
apresenta a sua própria perspetiva interna, para a qual a crença na verdade de proposições dogmáticas é o constituinte principal da religiosidade. Exposta esta tensão entre sucessores de Wittgenstein, passarei à discussão de sua própria obra, que contém, nas observações sobre a sistematicidade e interligação de crenças na sua epistemologia tardia, elementos informativos para uma proposta de resolução. Finalmente, discutirei o
pensamento de J. H. Newman, no qual encontramos importantes noções sobre a interação entre a ação e elementos simbólicos e factuais na crença religiosa. Ao fim destas análises, espero apresentar elementos para uma abordagem à filosofia da religião, ainda ‘externa’ e neutra em relação a alegações de verdade religiosa, mas capaz de melhor acomodar os diferentes sentidos — simbólicos ou factuais — atribuídos a estas alegações pelos seus crentes.
Contemporary Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion has as a paradigmatic approach the treatment of religious beliefs and practices as relatively isolated language games. One of the main limitations of this approach is the difficulty in understanding the value and importance of religion in the broader context of the believer’s life, in what I call the ‘importance problem’ for religious belief. Following a presentation of this problem, I will propose that the elements for its resolution can already be found in the Wittgensteinian tradition itself, as well as in authors relevant to it. First, I will discuss the thought of G. E. M. Anscombe, who puts forward a distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ perspectives to religious belief, and presents her own inner viewpoint, which takes belief in the truth of dogmatic propositions as the main constituent of religiosity. Once this tension between the followers of Wittgenstein is exposed, I will discuss his own works, which include, in his later epistemological remarks on the sistematicity and interconectedness of beliefs, important elements for a resolution. Finally, I will discuss the thought of J. H. Newman, in which we may find important ideas about the interaction between action and the symbolic and factual elements of religious belief. By the end of these analyses, I hope to present elements for an approach to the philosophy of religion which, while still ‘outer’ and neutral towards religious truth claims, may be better able to understand the different sorts of meaning — symbolic or factual — given to these claims by their believers.
Contemporary Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion has as a paradigmatic approach the treatment of religious beliefs and practices as relatively isolated language games. One of the main limitations of this approach is the difficulty in understanding the value and importance of religion in the broader context of the believer’s life, in what I call the ‘importance problem’ for religious belief. Following a presentation of this problem, I will propose that the elements for its resolution can already be found in the Wittgensteinian tradition itself, as well as in authors relevant to it. First, I will discuss the thought of G. E. M. Anscombe, who puts forward a distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ perspectives to religious belief, and presents her own inner viewpoint, which takes belief in the truth of dogmatic propositions as the main constituent of religiosity. Once this tension between the followers of Wittgenstein is exposed, I will discuss his own works, which include, in his later epistemological remarks on the sistematicity and interconectedness of beliefs, important elements for a resolution. Finally, I will discuss the thought of J. H. Newman, in which we may find important ideas about the interaction between action and the symbolic and factual elements of religious belief. By the end of these analyses, I hope to present elements for an approach to the philosophy of religion which, while still ‘outer’ and neutral towards religious truth claims, may be better able to understand the different sorts of meaning — symbolic or factual — given to these claims by their believers.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Filosofia da religião Epistemologia da religião Crença religiosa Assentimento Wittgenstein