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Vulnerabilidade, dependência e comunidade: Uma análise crítica da proposta de Alasdair Maclntyre de uma ética das virtudes em Dependent Rational Animals
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O principal objetivo desta tese é analisar criticamente a proposta de Alasdair MacIntyre, em Dependent Rational Animals, para uma nova ética das virtudes, suportada na revisão de parte da sua proposta filosófica inicialmente apresentada em After Virtue, procurando ao mesmo tempo problematizar e refletir sobre a pertinência e radicalidade da referida proposta no contexto da realidade moderna. MacIntyre pretende revisitar a sua teoria sobre o papel das virtudes, desta vez com o contributo da reflexão sobre a condição animal
do ser humano – e da sua “biologia metafísica” – e, através das relações de “dar e receber” que estabelecemos com o “outro”, ilustrar o modo como nos tornamos seres racionais práticos, dotados de um juízo independente. Isto leva-o a contemplar potenciais modelos de organização social e política que possibilitem um contexto propício para o exercício das virtudes do ser racional prático, e a destacar as virtudes do reconhecimento da dependência, resultantes de uma proposta congregante de inspiração aristotélica e
tomista. Tendo este contexto filosófico em perspetiva, considerámos a estrutura tripartida apresentada em Dependent Rational Animals, destacando um conjunto de pontos de reflexão que interrogam o texto de MacIntyre: primeiro, a comparação da condição animal do ser humano com outras espécies animais inteligentes enquanto contribuição para a reflexão sobre a vulnerabilidade, a dependência do “outro” na formação do juízo racional prático; segundo, de que forma a vulnerabilidade do ser humano, e as relações
que estabelecemos com o outro são constituintes da nossa formação moral, com vista à prosperidade coletiva e individual; terceiro, a rejeição do estado-moderno e da família como estruturas sociais e políticas ideais que possibilita o desenvolvimento e transmissão das virtudes do reconhecimento da dependência e das virtudes do ser racional prático independente, com vista à partilha de um “bem comum”, e que alternativas são
apresentadas por MacIntyre para a idealização de um modelo adequado. A análise centra-se nestas questões, e na radicalidade das suas implicações na vida coletiva e individual, procurando igualmente ressalvar os importantes contributos de MacIntyre para a reflexão sobre a necessidade de uma nova consideração filosófica e política sobre o ser humano no contexto da modernidade.
The main objective of this thesis is to critically analyze the proposal of Alasdair MacIntyre, in Dependent Rational Animals, for a new virtue ethics, supported by the revision of part of his philosophical proposal initially presented in After Virtue, seeking at the same time to problematize and reflect on the pertinence and radicality of this proposal in the context of modern reality. MacIntyre intends to revisit his theory on the role of virtues, this time with the contribution of reflection on the animal condition of the human being – and its "metaphysical biology" – and, through the "give and take" relationships we establish with the "other", illustrate how we become practical rational beings, endowed with an independent judgment. This leads him to contemplate potential models of social and political organization that enable a context conducive to the exercise of the virtues of the practical rational being, and to highlight the virtues of the recognition of dependence, resulting from a congregating proposal of Aristotelian and Thomistic inspiration. Having this philosophical context in perspective, we considered the tripartite structure presented in Dependent Rational Animals, highlighting a set of points of reflection that interrogate MacIntyre's text: first, the comparison of the animal condition of the human being with other intelligent animal species as a contribution to the reflection on vulnerability, the dependence of the "other" in the formation of practical rational judgment; second, how the vulnerability of the human being, and the relationships we establish with the other, are constituents of our moral formation, with a view to collective and individual prosperity; third, the rejection of the modern state and the family as the ideal social and political structure that enables the development and transmission of the virtues of the recognition of dependence and the virtues of the independent practical rational being, with a view to sharing a "common good", and what alternatives are presented by MacIntyre for the idealization of an adequate model. The analysis focuses on these issues, and on the radicality of their implications in collective and individual life, also seeking to highlight MacIntyre's important contributions to the reflection on the need for a new philosophical and political consideration of the human being in the context of modernity.
The main objective of this thesis is to critically analyze the proposal of Alasdair MacIntyre, in Dependent Rational Animals, for a new virtue ethics, supported by the revision of part of his philosophical proposal initially presented in After Virtue, seeking at the same time to problematize and reflect on the pertinence and radicality of this proposal in the context of modern reality. MacIntyre intends to revisit his theory on the role of virtues, this time with the contribution of reflection on the animal condition of the human being – and its "metaphysical biology" – and, through the "give and take" relationships we establish with the "other", illustrate how we become practical rational beings, endowed with an independent judgment. This leads him to contemplate potential models of social and political organization that enable a context conducive to the exercise of the virtues of the practical rational being, and to highlight the virtues of the recognition of dependence, resulting from a congregating proposal of Aristotelian and Thomistic inspiration. Having this philosophical context in perspective, we considered the tripartite structure presented in Dependent Rational Animals, highlighting a set of points of reflection that interrogate MacIntyre's text: first, the comparison of the animal condition of the human being with other intelligent animal species as a contribution to the reflection on vulnerability, the dependence of the "other" in the formation of practical rational judgment; second, how the vulnerability of the human being, and the relationships we establish with the other, are constituents of our moral formation, with a view to collective and individual prosperity; third, the rejection of the modern state and the family as the ideal social and political structure that enables the development and transmission of the virtues of the recognition of dependence and the virtues of the independent practical rational being, with a view to sharing a "common good", and what alternatives are presented by MacIntyre for the idealization of an adequate model. The analysis focuses on these issues, and on the radicality of their implications in collective and individual life, also seeking to highlight MacIntyre's important contributions to the reflection on the need for a new philosophical and political consideration of the human being in the context of modernity.
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Palavras-chave
Vulnerabilidade Outro Ética Virtudes Justa generosidade Reconhecimento da dependência Comunidade Bem comum Vulnerability The other Ethics Virtues Just generosity Acknowledged dependence Community Common good