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Escaping the Darwinian Dilemma with Cooperation-based Moral Realism
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O realismo moral é a posição metaética que defende a existência de factos morais. Alguns filósofos têm apresentado argumentos que contestam esta ideia, apelando à formação evolutiva das nossas capacidades morais – estes argumentos ficaram conhecidos como “argumentos evolutivos de desmascaramento”. O famoso ‘dilema Darwiniano’ de Sharon Street é um desses argumentos. O argumento é o seguinte: visto que as nossas capacidades morais têm um passado evolutivo, o realista tem de clarificar se existe ou não uma relação entre este pano de fundo e os fatos morais postulados. De acordo com Street, ambas as respostas são indefensáveis para o realista. Acreditamos que isto não é verdade. Ao aceitarmos o desafio de Street, ao explorarmos as consequentes respostas disponíveis na literatura e ao analisarmos a natureza da moralidade à luz da evolução da cooperação, construímos uma proposta para o realista moral que apoia a existência dessa relação de uma maneira satisfatória. Os factos morais são factos sobre cooperação, que por sua vez são factos sobre adaptação evolutiva. Defendemos que esta via naturalista consegue superar o dilema Darwiniano, enfraquecendo os argumentos evolutivos de desmascaramento e reforçando o realismo moral. Embora concedamos que um realismo moral baseado na cooperação ainda tem de enfrentar desafios difíceis, consegue escapar ao desmascaramento evolutivo.
Moral realism is the metaethical position that moral facts exist. Some philosophers have advanced arguments in opposition to this idea by appealing to the evolutionary formation of our moral capacities – these arguments have come to be known as “evolutionary debunking arguments”. Sharon Street’s famous ‘Darwinian dilemma’ is one of such arguments. The argument is this: since our moral capacities have an evolutionary past, the realist must clarify whether there is a relation between this background and the postulated moral facts or not. According to Street, both responses are untenable for the realist. We believe that this is not true. By accepting Street’s challenge, by exploring consequent replies available in the literature, and by looking at the nature of morality in light of the evolution of cooperation, we construct a conjecture for the moral realist to assert the existence of such a relation in a satisfactory way. Moral facts are facts about cooperation, which in turn are facts about evolutionary adaptation. We argue this naturalist route can overcome the Darwinian dilemma, undermining the strength of “evolutionary debunking arguments”, and bolstering moral realism. While we concede that cooperation-based moral realism still faces difficult challenges, it nevertheless escapes evolutionary debunking.
Moral realism is the metaethical position that moral facts exist. Some philosophers have advanced arguments in opposition to this idea by appealing to the evolutionary formation of our moral capacities – these arguments have come to be known as “evolutionary debunking arguments”. Sharon Street’s famous ‘Darwinian dilemma’ is one of such arguments. The argument is this: since our moral capacities have an evolutionary past, the realist must clarify whether there is a relation between this background and the postulated moral facts or not. According to Street, both responses are untenable for the realist. We believe that this is not true. By accepting Street’s challenge, by exploring consequent replies available in the literature, and by looking at the nature of morality in light of the evolution of cooperation, we construct a conjecture for the moral realist to assert the existence of such a relation in a satisfactory way. Moral facts are facts about cooperation, which in turn are facts about evolutionary adaptation. We argue this naturalist route can overcome the Darwinian dilemma, undermining the strength of “evolutionary debunking arguments”, and bolstering moral realism. While we concede that cooperation-based moral realism still faces difficult challenges, it nevertheless escapes evolutionary debunking.
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Palavras-chave
Ética evolutiva Realismo moral Cooperação Argumentos evolutivos de desmascaramento Altruísmo Dilema Darwiniano Evolutionary ethics Moral realism Cooperation Evolutionary debunking arguments Altruism Darwinian dilemma