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Legislation introduced in the U.S. in 2002/2003 significantly changed board composition of public firms by imposing a 50% independent directors’ ratio. Research on the effect of independent directors is not consensual, implying that this exogenous shock is a unique opportunity to study their importance. This study answers the question of whether or not independent directors can effectively mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and the management, having a positive impact on the choice of successful R&D projects. We find that an increase of board independence has a positive impact on patent counts. Hence, the results support that independent directors truly spur innovation and risk taking.
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Innovation Corporate governance Board independence Patents
