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On The Significance of Reason, Finitude and Vulnerability in Moral Constructivism
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The present dissertation is a work of philosophical inquiry on the moral implications of ontological vulnerability and finitude within a moral constructivist framework of ethics and morality. Specifically, the aim is to understand whether these concepts, in conjunction with practical reason, can help ground objective moral norms in a way that is stronger than standard constructivist approaches thus far, where only practical reason is accounted for. The theoretical framework chosen - moral constructivism - must first be elaborated on, analyzing where it stands in the realism/anti-realism debate as a metaethical theory. Establishing this general framework leads me to employ a chronological study of its main contenders, to better understand the intricacies and divisive aspects of each approach. Doing so helps me make better sense of why each of them has been unable to vindicate moral objectivity through the use of practical reason alone, in the case of Kantian constructivism, and the subsequent uprising of Humean constructivism, which abandons the project of vindicating moral objectivity altogether. Accepting that the practical standpoint of moral reasoning is incomplete with pure reason alone, but rejecting that moral objectivity must be forfeit, I propose that finitude and ontological vulnerability, together with practical reason, can ground moral objectivity under a substantive claim to embodied autonomy, establishing a moral principle of non-exploitation of another’s vulnerability. Reason grounds moral agency, whereas vulnerability grounds moral subject-ableness / “subjectness.” From this convergence, morality is created.
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Palavras-chave
Construtivismo Razão Moral Realismo Norma Morality Constructivism Realism Anti-Realism Normativity Reason Agency Vulnerability