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Wrong (management) compensation practices in European banks - solved or still present
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether there are still (wrong) remuneration contract incentivesthat increase the risk-taking behaviour of banks. It is found that established Directives have not been implemented uniformly by all nations which necessitate the introduction of further regulations. By using variable compensation data of32banks from 12 different European nations in a period from 2010 to 2020, this thesis empirically evaluates the impact of CEO variable compensation on bank risk. More specifically, it investigates whether CEO remuneration has a significant positive impact on bank risk-taking. Relying on a fixed effects model, this story could not find support for this expectation. Rather, it seems like there is no relationship between the two variables –as also demonstrated with a robustness check.
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Finance Banking Banking regulation Ceo compensation Ceo risk-taking Financial stability