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SHADOW BANKING IN THE EU: A CALL FOR A RISK-RETURN REGULATORY APPROACH
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O termo shadow banking surgiu no início dos anos 2000, durante o boom de securitização nos Estados Unidos. Foi cunhado por Paul McCulley para designar um conjunto de entidades não bancárias que desempenhavam funções semelhantes às bancárias, mas fora do perímetro regulatório tradicional. Desde então, a expressão ganhou uso corrente na literatura econômica e jurídica, mas permanece marcada por ambiguidades.
A primeira observação necessária é que shadow banking não designa uma lista fixa de instituições. Ele deve ser compreendido como um sistema fluido de atores não bancários que, em maior ou menor grau, replicam funções típicas da intermediação financeira bancária. Ao contrário dos bancos, a maioria dessas entidades não aceita depósitos e tampouco concede empréstimos de forma clássica. Ainda assim, compartilham algumas características e efeitos com os bancos: ampliam o crédito disponível, canalizam recursos para a economia e podem gerar crises bancárias. É por isso que foram associadas à atividade bancária, mesmo sem serem bancos propriamente ditos. Essas instituições cresceram à margem da regulação, explorando lacunas jurídicas. O resultado foi a constituição de uma teia paralela de intermediação financeira que parecia inovadora e eficiente, mas que carregava riscos equivalentes — ou superiores — aos da atividade bancária clássica. Importa notar que shadow banking não se desenvolveu em oposição aos bancos regulados; pelo contrário, os bancos desempenharam papel central em sua emergência. Podem ser entendidos, portanto, como uma extensão dos próprios bancos, criada por eles e a seu serviço.
Para compreender a gênese do shadow banking e sua similaridade com a atividade bancária, mostrou-se útil situá-lo no processo histórico mais amplo de desenvolvimento da atividade dos bancos em um geral. Observou-se que a trajetória do setor bancário é marcada por um desenvolvimento cumulativo, no qual cada fase posterior acrescenta novas funções às anteriores, até terem culminado no que hoje se designa shadow banking. Observou-se que a emergência de instituições e atividades shadow banking consistiu em um resultado lógico e esperado, vindo de um sistema bancário em constante busca de eficiência regulatória, dispersão de riscos e rentabilidade crescente.
Conforme a atividade bancária evoluiu, evoluíram também os seus riscos. O sistema de shadow banking não apenas compartilha desses riscos, como também os elevou a outro patamar. Do sistema shadow banking de intermediação financeira, argumenta-se, nasceram as preocupações com risco sistémico – que, por sua vez, aparenta estar devidamente neutralizado por uma densa rede de supervisão e regulação estabelecida pelas autoridades financeiras ao redor do mundo.
No que diz respeito à regulação destinada a neutralizar os riscos do shadow banking, um dos pontos centrais desta dissertação é a de que tal regulação está excessivamente orientada para prevenir falências bancárias, deixando em segundo plano outros riscos possivelmente mais danosos. Tais riscos referem-se à má alocação de capital e ao endividamento de baixa qualidade. O primeiro ocorre quando recursos são direcionados para atividades especulativas ou de baixo valor social em vez de investimentos produtivos. O segundo pode ser entendido como produto ou efeito colateral do primeiro: trata-se da canalização de crédito que serve majoritariamente para sustentar consumo ou a compra de ativos, gerando endividamento infrutífero que compromete o crescimento de longo prazo da economia. Demonstrou-se que ambos os riscos estão intimamente ligados à atuação das entidades de shadow banking focadas nesta dissertação: money market funds, hedge funds e private equity funds.
Além de representarem riscos para a economia, os três segmentos mencionados apresentam um potencial muito questionável de contribuir para o desenvolvimento dela. O cenário que se revela é, portanto, desbalanceado: recursos da sociedade são canalizados para prevenir eventuais danos causados por agentes econômicos que, por sua vez, demonstram esquálida intenção e/ou capacidade de promover melhorias a ela. Surge, assim, a questão: qual a utilidade de se gastar recursos sociais para mitigar riscos de atividades que não geram à sociedade benefícios?
Nesse contexto, a tese deste trabalho é que a regulação financeira atual está mal orientada. Ela parte de uma doutrina, consolidada no século 20, segundo a qual o objetivo último da regulação é promover estabilidade financeira. A dissertação que aqui se apresenta rejeita tal hipótese, argumentando que a estabilidade financeira deve ser vista como um meio, e não como um fim regulatório. O fim da regulação financeira deveria ser o mesmo das políticas fiscal e monetária: a promoção do bem-estar econômico e social. Da falta desta percepção nasce um regime regulatório que, apesar de garantir um sistema financeiro resiliente a colapsos imediatos, o possibilita operar em um círculo fechado feito para gerar ganhos privados, mas poucos ou nenhum ganho social.
Para corrigir esse desvio, esta dissertação propõe uma mudança de paradigma: a adoção de uma abordagem risco–retorno na regulação do shadow banking. Ou seja, para que uma entidade possa assumir riscos para a economia, deve primeiro demonstrar sua capacidade de gerar a ela benefícios. Entre as medidas concretas sugeridas estão: restringir o investimento de intermediários alavancados em MMFs; impor maior transparência ao setor de private equity; e condicionar a alocação de crédito a fundos de investimento à sua capacidade ou intenção de contribuir para a economia. Tais medidas, argumenta-se, favoreceriam a existência de um mercado privado que operasse, contudo, dentro de balizas compatíveis com a prosperidade social (uma vez que usufrui de recursos sociais).
The term shadow banking emerged in the early 2000s, during the securitisation boom in the United States. It was coined by Paul McCulley to designate a set of non-bank entities that performed functions similar to those of banks, but outside the traditional regulatory perimeter. Since then, the expression has gained widespread use in economic and legal literature, although it remains marked by ambiguities. The first necessary observation is that shadow banking does not refer to a fixed list of institutions. It should be understood as a fluid system of non-bank actors that, to a greater or lesser extent, replicate typical functions of financial intermediation performed by banks. Unlike banks, most of these entities neither accept deposits nor extend loans in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, they share certain characteristics and effects with banks: they expand the availability of credit, channel resources into the economy, and may trigger financial crises. For this reason, they have been associated with banking activity, even though they are not banks in the strict sense. These institutions grew outside the regulatory perimeter, exploiting legal loopholes. The result was the formation of a parallel network of financial intermediation that appeared innovative and efficient, but which carried risks equivalent to—or even greater than—those of traditional banking. It is important to note that shadow banking did not develop in opposition to regulated banks. On the contrary, banks played a central role in its emergence. They can therefore be understood as an extension of the banks themselves, created by them and serving their purposes. To understand the origins of shadow banking and its similarity to traditional banking, it is useful to situate it within the broader historical process of banking development. The trajectory of the sector is marked by cumulative evolution, in which each subsequent stage added new functions to the previous ones, eventually culminating in what is now designated as shadow banking. The emergence of shadow banking institutions and activities was therefore a logical and expected result of a banking system in constant pursuit of regulatory efficiency, risk dispersion, and increasing profitability. As banking activity evolved, so too did its risks. The shadow banking system not only shares these risks but has also elevated them to a new level. It can be argued that modern concerns with systemic risk originated precisely from the shadow banking system of financial intermediation—concerns which, in turn, appear to have been contained through a dense web of supervision and regulation established by financial authorities worldwide. With respect to the regulation intended to neutralise the risks of shadow banking, one of the central arguments of this dissertation is that such regulation is excessively focused on preventing bank failures, while downplaying other risks that may be even more harmful. These risks refer to the misallocation of capital and the build-up of low-quality debt. The first occurs when resources are directed towards speculative activities or those of low social value instead of productive investments. The second may be understood as a by-product of the first: it results from credit being channelled mainly to sustain consumption or the purchase of assets, generating unproductive indebtedness that undermines long-term economic growth. Both risks are shown to be closely linked to the activities of the shadow banking entities examined in this dissertation: money market funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds. In addition to posing risks to the economy, the three segments mentioned above have a highly questionable potential to support its development. The scenario that emerges is therefore one of imbalance: society’s resources are channelled into preventing potential damage caused by economic agents who, in turn, demonstrate squalid intention and/or capacity to deliver improvements to society. This raises the question: what is the purpose of devoting social resources to mitigating risks from activities that generate no social benefits? In this context, the central critique of this work is that current financial regulation is poorly oriented. It rests on a doctrine, consolidated in the 20th century, which holds that the ultimate goal of regulation is to promote financial stability. The dissertation hereby presented rejects that hypothesis, arguing instead that financial stability should be seen as a means, not as a regulatory end. The purpose of financial regulation should be the same as that of fiscal and monetary policy: the promotion of economic and social welfare. The absence of this perspective gave rise to a regulatory framework which, although ensuring a financial system resilient to immediate collapses, allows it to operate in a closed circuit designed to generate private gains with little or no social benefit. To correct this deviation, this dissertation proposes a paradigm shift: the adoption of a risk–return approach to the regulation of shadow banking. In other words, for an entity to be allowed to pose risks to the economy, it must first demonstrate its capacity to generate real economic benefits. Among the concrete measures suggested are: restricting leveraged intermediaries from investing in MMFs; imposing greater transparency obligations on the private equity sector; and conditioning the allocation of credit to investment funds on their capacity or intention to contribute to the economy. Such measures, it is argued, would encourage the existence of a private market that remains dynamic but operates within boundaries consistent with social prosperity (given that it ultimately relies on collective resources).
The term shadow banking emerged in the early 2000s, during the securitisation boom in the United States. It was coined by Paul McCulley to designate a set of non-bank entities that performed functions similar to those of banks, but outside the traditional regulatory perimeter. Since then, the expression has gained widespread use in economic and legal literature, although it remains marked by ambiguities. The first necessary observation is that shadow banking does not refer to a fixed list of institutions. It should be understood as a fluid system of non-bank actors that, to a greater or lesser extent, replicate typical functions of financial intermediation performed by banks. Unlike banks, most of these entities neither accept deposits nor extend loans in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, they share certain characteristics and effects with banks: they expand the availability of credit, channel resources into the economy, and may trigger financial crises. For this reason, they have been associated with banking activity, even though they are not banks in the strict sense. These institutions grew outside the regulatory perimeter, exploiting legal loopholes. The result was the formation of a parallel network of financial intermediation that appeared innovative and efficient, but which carried risks equivalent to—or even greater than—those of traditional banking. It is important to note that shadow banking did not develop in opposition to regulated banks. On the contrary, banks played a central role in its emergence. They can therefore be understood as an extension of the banks themselves, created by them and serving their purposes. To understand the origins of shadow banking and its similarity to traditional banking, it is useful to situate it within the broader historical process of banking development. The trajectory of the sector is marked by cumulative evolution, in which each subsequent stage added new functions to the previous ones, eventually culminating in what is now designated as shadow banking. The emergence of shadow banking institutions and activities was therefore a logical and expected result of a banking system in constant pursuit of regulatory efficiency, risk dispersion, and increasing profitability. As banking activity evolved, so too did its risks. The shadow banking system not only shares these risks but has also elevated them to a new level. It can be argued that modern concerns with systemic risk originated precisely from the shadow banking system of financial intermediation—concerns which, in turn, appear to have been contained through a dense web of supervision and regulation established by financial authorities worldwide. With respect to the regulation intended to neutralise the risks of shadow banking, one of the central arguments of this dissertation is that such regulation is excessively focused on preventing bank failures, while downplaying other risks that may be even more harmful. These risks refer to the misallocation of capital and the build-up of low-quality debt. The first occurs when resources are directed towards speculative activities or those of low social value instead of productive investments. The second may be understood as a by-product of the first: it results from credit being channelled mainly to sustain consumption or the purchase of assets, generating unproductive indebtedness that undermines long-term economic growth. Both risks are shown to be closely linked to the activities of the shadow banking entities examined in this dissertation: money market funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds. In addition to posing risks to the economy, the three segments mentioned above have a highly questionable potential to support its development. The scenario that emerges is therefore one of imbalance: society’s resources are channelled into preventing potential damage caused by economic agents who, in turn, demonstrate squalid intention and/or capacity to deliver improvements to society. This raises the question: what is the purpose of devoting social resources to mitigating risks from activities that generate no social benefits? In this context, the central critique of this work is that current financial regulation is poorly oriented. It rests on a doctrine, consolidated in the 20th century, which holds that the ultimate goal of regulation is to promote financial stability. The dissertation hereby presented rejects that hypothesis, arguing instead that financial stability should be seen as a means, not as a regulatory end. The purpose of financial regulation should be the same as that of fiscal and monetary policy: the promotion of economic and social welfare. The absence of this perspective gave rise to a regulatory framework which, although ensuring a financial system resilient to immediate collapses, allows it to operate in a closed circuit designed to generate private gains with little or no social benefit. To correct this deviation, this dissertation proposes a paradigm shift: the adoption of a risk–return approach to the regulation of shadow banking. In other words, for an entity to be allowed to pose risks to the economy, it must first demonstrate its capacity to generate real economic benefits. Among the concrete measures suggested are: restricting leveraged intermediaries from investing in MMFs; imposing greater transparency obligations on the private equity sector; and conditioning the allocation of credit to investment funds on their capacity or intention to contribute to the economy. Such measures, it is argued, would encourage the existence of a private market that remains dynamic but operates within boundaries consistent with social prosperity (given that it ultimately relies on collective resources).
Descrição
Palavras-chave
shadow banking entidades não bancárias regulação financeira abordagem risco–retorno non-bank entities financial regulation risk–return approach