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Two-sided markets with inter and intra-group externalities: with an application to the shopping mall case
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Resumo(s)
I study optimal pricing in a two-sided market with inter and intra-group externalities. I first consider a general theoretical model for the case of a monopoly platform. I show that while positive inter or intra-group externalities create value to the platform, negative inter or intra-group externalities destroy it. I then focus on the more specific case of a shopping mall. The shopping mall acts as a platform in a two-sided market since it matches consumers with shops. I find that the shopping’s revenue should be extracted mostly from the retailers’ side of the market, i.e., shopping malls should charge more aggressively retailers than consumers. The main reason is that consumers’ present lower intra-group externalities and higher inter-group externalities what leads to an increase in the platform’s marginal gain of lower price charged to consumers while making profit on the retailers’ side of the market.
Descrição
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the Faculdade de Economia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa