A carregar...
Publicação
The Impact on Peer Group Composition of the 2006 SEC’s Rule for Executive Compensation
| Nome: | Descrição: | Tamanho: | Formato: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 365.5 KB | Adobe PDF |
Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
A 2006 SEC rule requires enhanced executive compensation disclosure, namely in what concerns peer groups used when benchmarking. This study aims at assessing possible effects of this rule, using hand-collected data for the S&P500 firms on 2006
and 2007. The data suggests the new SEC rule is not associated with an improvement on peer groups’ composition disclosures, which leaves room for managers to manipulate the composition of their peers. Other findings: (1) the number of firms that use the
services of compensation consultants increased significantly and this inflates compensation levels, (2) compensation depends on luck among other factors.
Descrição
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the Faculdade de Economia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Palavras-chave
Executive Compensation Peer Groups SEC’s Disclosure Rules