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I study 1858 mergers and acquisitions by US public acquirers between 1984 and 2020 to assess
the impact of cross-ownership on post-M&A acquirer bankruptcy risk. Addressing a gap in
existing literature, my statistically significant findings indicate that presence of cross ownership and a higher number of cross-owners decrease bankruptcy risk. Notably, risk is
elevated with greater cross-ownership levels and larger cross-owner stakes in acquirers,
explained by higher asymmetric information. Conversely, bigger cross-owner stakes in targets
reduce bankruptcy risk. In conjunction with cross-ownership, greater executive motivation
lowers risk, whereas interaction between higher number of cross-owners and monitoring
increases post-M&A bankruptcy risk.
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Corporate finance Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) Institutional investors Cross-ownership Bankruptcy risk Z-score model
