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This work project contributes to a growing literature that studies the effect of managerial heterogeneity on corporate decisions, particularly risk-taking behavior, by examining the effect of experiencing financial distress on a manager’s long-term risk-aversion, reflected in firm policies, using a sample of public companies based in the United States (US). I document that Chief Executive Officers(CEOs)who experienced financial distress as predicted by z-score analysis or credit rating down grades choose more risk-averse financial and investment policies than their counterparts, whereas Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) who experienced financial distress choose riskier financial policies than their counterparts.
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Corporate governance Corporate finance Capital structure Financial distress Investments Diversification
