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Publicação
One - Memory in Repeated Games
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 – memory strategies. First, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained by any 1 – memory subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, a complete characterization of 1 – memory simple strategies is provided, and it is employed to establish the following in games with more than two players each having connected action spaces:
1. all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by an ε – subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of 1 – memory, 2. all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by a 1 – memory subgame equilibrium, and 3. the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds for 1 – memory strategies. While no further restrictions are needed for the third result to hold in 2 – player games, an additional restriction is needed for the first two: players must have common punishments.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Repeated Games Memory Bounded Rationality Folk Theorem
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme, One - Memory in Repeated Games (November, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 500