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One - Memory in Repeated Games

dc.contributor.authorBarlo, Mehmet
dc.contributor.authorCarmona, Guilherme
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-01T14:55:03Z
dc.date.available2019-10-01T14:55:03Z
dc.date.issued2006-11-17
dc.description.abstractWe study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 – memory strategies. First, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained by any 1 – memory subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, a complete characterization of 1 – memory simple strategies is provided, and it is employed to establish the following in games with more than two players each having connected action spaces: 1. all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by an ε – subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of 1 – memory, 2. all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by a 1 – memory subgame equilibrium, and 3. the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds for 1 – memory strategies. While no further restrictions are needed for the third result to hold in 2 – player games, an additional restriction is needed for the first two: players must have common punishments.pt_PT
dc.description.versionN/Apt_PT
dc.identifier.citationBarlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme, One - Memory in Repeated Games (November, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 500pt_PT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/82858
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewednopt_PT
dc.publisherNova SBEpt_PT
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFEUNL Working Paper Series;500
dc.subjectRepeated Gamespt_PT
dc.subjectMemorypt_PT
dc.subjectBounded Rationalitypt_PT
dc.subjectFolk Theorempt_PT
dc.titleOne - Memory in Repeated Gamespt_PT
dc.typeworking paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
person.familyNameBarlo
person.familyNameCarmona
person.givenNameMehmet
person.givenNameGuilherme
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-6871-5078
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-3017-2415
person.identifier.scopus-author-id23396042200
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typeworkingPaperpt_PT
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4f41f0d4-7c15-4ea7-91da-a694e49afffc
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationa9b22c26-9106-417f-8faa-2383d6b717ab
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4f41f0d4-7c15-4ea7-91da-a694e49afffc

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