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Deep Disagreement: An argumentative analysis of the conflict of 2001 in Macedonian and Albanian language media
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Em seu artigo canônico “A lógica do desacordo profundo”, o filósofo americano Robert Fogelin (1985), causou um terremoto chocante nas teorias da argumentação, cujos tremores são sentidos até hoje – 40 anos após sua primeira introdução, ao dizer que certos “desacordos”, em particular, “discordâncias profundas”, não podem ser resolvidas por argumentos racionais. Se esta linha de raciocínio estiver correta, então poderemos ser forçados a concluir que a razão e a argumentação desempenham um papel decepcionantemente pequeno quando mais precisamos delas, especialmente em questões sociais importantes. Nesses casos, portanto, além da necessidade teórica, há também uma urgência prática de compreender o que são “desentendimentos”, como ocorrem e se podem ser resolvidos racionalmente ou não. Nesta tese, portanto, procura-se assegurar às teorias da argumentação que não há necessidade de alarme em relação a discursos de natureza “profunda discordância”. Ao confiar no estudo de caso em questão, será feita uma tentativa de demonstrar claramente que não existe “discordo profundo” em primeiro lugar, ou se fizermos uma concessão de que tais desacordos existem, então afirmaremos que estes “desacordos” pode ser resolvido através de uma reconstrução cuidadosa do discurso argumentativo. Em outras palavras, sustentamos que “discordâncias profundas” não existem de forma alguma, desde que reconstruamos discursos argumentativos de natureza de “discordância profunda” como um discurso argumentativo complexo de um “trílogo” em vez de um “diálogo”, através da introdução de uma intervenção de “terceiros”, ao que normalmente seria uma conversa entre duas pessoas. Desta forma, a força gravitacional do “terceiro” é tão ‘poderosa’ que ‘atrai’ todas as partes numa discussão a colapsarem em direcção a esta força, e como consequência, há uma resolução racional de discursos de “profundo desacordo” natureza.
In his canonical paper “The logic of deep disagreement,” American philosopher Robert Fogelin (1985), caused shocking earthquake for argumentation theories, tremors of which are felt even today – 40 years after its first introduction, by saying that certain ‘disagreements’, in particular “deep disagreements”, cannot be resolved by rational arguments. If this line of reasoning is right, then we might be forced to conclude that reason and argumentation play a disappointingly small role when we need it the most, especially on important social matters. In such cases, therefore, beside theoretical necessity, there is a practical urgency as well, to understand what ‘disagreements’ are, how they occur, and whether they can be rationally resolved or not. In this thesis, therefore, an attempt is made to assure argumentation theories that there is no need for alarm with regard to discourses of “deep disagreement” nature. By relying on the case study at hand, an attempt will be made to demonstrate clearly that there is no “deep disagreement” in the first place, or if we make a concession that such disagreements do exist, then we claim that these ‘disagreements’ can be resolved through a careful reconstruction of the argumentative discourse. In other words, we maintain that “deep disagreements” do not exist at all, as long as we reconstruct argumentative discourses of “deep disagreement” nature as a complex argumentative discourse of a “trialogue” instead of a “dialogue”, through the introduction of a “third party” intervention, to what would normally be a conversation between two people. In this way, the gravitational force of the “third party” is so ‘powerful’ that ‘attracts’ all the parties in a discussion to collapse towards this force, and as a consequence, there is a rational resolution of discourses of “deep disagreement” nature.
In his canonical paper “The logic of deep disagreement,” American philosopher Robert Fogelin (1985), caused shocking earthquake for argumentation theories, tremors of which are felt even today – 40 years after its first introduction, by saying that certain ‘disagreements’, in particular “deep disagreements”, cannot be resolved by rational arguments. If this line of reasoning is right, then we might be forced to conclude that reason and argumentation play a disappointingly small role when we need it the most, especially on important social matters. In such cases, therefore, beside theoretical necessity, there is a practical urgency as well, to understand what ‘disagreements’ are, how they occur, and whether they can be rationally resolved or not. In this thesis, therefore, an attempt is made to assure argumentation theories that there is no need for alarm with regard to discourses of “deep disagreement” nature. By relying on the case study at hand, an attempt will be made to demonstrate clearly that there is no “deep disagreement” in the first place, or if we make a concession that such disagreements do exist, then we claim that these ‘disagreements’ can be resolved through a careful reconstruction of the argumentative discourse. In other words, we maintain that “deep disagreements” do not exist at all, as long as we reconstruct argumentative discourses of “deep disagreement” nature as a complex argumentative discourse of a “trialogue” instead of a “dialogue”, through the introduction of a “third party” intervention, to what would normally be a conversation between two people. In this way, the gravitational force of the “third party” is so ‘powerful’ that ‘attracts’ all the parties in a discussion to collapse towards this force, and as a consequence, there is a rational resolution of discourses of “deep disagreement” nature.
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Palavras-chave
Discordância profundas Deep disagreement Trílogo Trialogue Diálogo Dialogue Terceiros Third party