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Using experimental evidence to improve delegated enforcement
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Digital content today is governed by online providers like Facebook or YouTube. Increasingly, these providers are expected to enforce the law by removing illegal content, such as copyright infringement or hate speech. Typically, once they are notified of its existence, they have to assess it and, if infringing, remove it. Otherwise, they face liability. This system of content moderation is a form of delegation of the state's tasks to private parties. In literature, it is empirically established that some schemes of delegated enforcement can trigger substantial false positives, mostly due to over-compliance by providers and under-assertion of rights by affected content creators. This results in a phenomenon known as over-blocking: collateral removal of lawful content. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test a possible solution to this issue, as proposed by Husovec (2016). Our results show that an external dispute resolution mechanism subject to a particular fee structure can significantly reduce over-compliance by providers and improve the accuracy of their decisions, largely thanks to the content creators taking initiative. It does so by re-calibrating the typical asymmetry of incentives under the delegated enforcement schemes. The principles behind the solution have the potential to improve also other schemes of delegated enforcement where providers have weak incentives to properly execute delegated tasks in the public interest.
Descrição
Funding Information: Funding for the experiment provided by the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) and the CentERLab is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Eric van Damme and Jan Potters for their feedback, as well as participants of the Prague Conference on Behavioral Sciences (2018), and seminar participants at the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Lund University, Tilburg University, and Masaryk University. Funding Information: Funding for the experiment provided by the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) and the CentERLab is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Eric van Damme and Jan Potters for their feedback, as well as participants of the Prague Conference on Behavioral Sciences (2018), and seminar participants at the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Lund University, Tilburg University, and Masaryk University. Publisher Copyright: © 2022 The Author(s)
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Alternative dispute resolution Content moderation Copyright Lab experiment Notice and takedown Online enforcement Finance Economics and Econometrics Law