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Social vs. individual age-dependent costs of imperfect vaccination
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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
In diseases with long-term immunity, vaccination is known to increase the average age at infection as a result of the decrease in the pathogen circulation. This implies that a vaccination campaign can have negative effects when a disease is more costly (financial or health-related costs) for higher ages. This work considers an age-structured population transmission model with imperfect vaccination. We aim to compare the social and individual costs of vaccination, assuming that disease costs are age-dependent, while the disease's dynamic is age-independent. A model for pathogen deterministic dynamics in a population consisting of juveniles and adults, assumed to be rational agents, is introduced. The parameter region for which vaccination has a positive social impact is fully characterized and the Nash equilibrium of the vaccination game is obtained. Finally, collective strategies designed to promote voluntary vaccination, without compromising social welfare, are discussed.
Descrição
Funding Information:
We acknowledge the insightful comments by Max Souza, Universidade Fluminense, Brazil and NOVA Math, Portugal and the three referees that helped to improve our manuscript. All the authors contributed equally to the development of the work’s ideas, computational codes, data analysis, discussions, and writing of the final version of the manuscript.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Author(s)
Palavras-chave
Age-structured models Epidemic models Nash equilibria Vaccination games Statistics and Probability Modelling and Simulation General Biochemistry,Genetics and Molecular Biology General Immunology and Microbiology General Agricultural and Biological Sciences Applied Mathematics SDG 3 - Good Health and Well-being