Frege contra Kant

Venturinha, N

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/158046

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Venturinha, N

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This paper addresses Frege’s reaction to Kant and questions an influential interpretation, championed by Jim Conant, according to which Frege endorses the essential tenets of Kant’s philosophy, namely his avant la lettre anti-psychologistic conception of pure logic. I argue that there are deep differences in point of view between them, which fuel their well-known disagreement about the nature of arithmetic, and that Frege’s rejection of some of the fundamental premises of Kantian epistemology led him to a quite distinct form of anti-psychologism. At the centre of the Frege-Kant dispute lies a completely different understanding of objectivity, which in Frege’s eyes must not be conceived as an expression of our taking to be true, as results from Kant’s framework.