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Rationality and rhizomatic thinking in games: collective action; voting behavior and voting rules
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Resumo(s)
Game Theory can simultaneously be viewed as a positive and a normative theory: on one hand, it describes what agents are expected to do in different contexts; on the other hand, it also prescribes what agents ought to do in those settings.
Individual rationality is the standard behavioral assumption that leads to these game -theoretic predictions (and prescriptions).
Several experiments and empirical evidence have however shown that agents' behavior often contradicts the theory, underlining the need to revise the individual rationality assumption. In particular, collective action settings seem to generate the most puzzling results, hinting at the possibility that the appropriate formulation of rationality may actually be game -specific. Behavior in voting games, games of public good contributions or even simple coordination games seem to require a more collective notion of rationality that is absent from the standard theory.
Our main goal in this thesis is therefore to attempt to reconcile individual rationality with more collective forms of rationality, allowing group identity to factor in the choice of an agent's action. The most relevant applications would be collective action settings, but our goal is to find a unifying assumption that can be applied in all settings and that generalizes the notion of individual rationality.
We do so by introducing potential constraints perceived by agents at the moment in which they make their choices. We therefore propose to relax the self-goal choice component of individual rationality: an agent's choice may now become constrained by the perception that the agent belongs to a group and that other
agents in that group also pursue their goals.