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Over the last decades, one of the main goals of economic regulation has been to increase competition in markets that have traditionally been less competitive.
In telecommunications, one of the instruments used by regulators to reduce the temporary monopoly power of existing networks is to force them to give access to potential entrants. The idea is that an incumbent makes part of its network available to firms that want to enter the market but have no capacity to build a complete network. This regulatory instrument has gained an important role since it started to be promoted more strongly in the United States after 1996 with the Telecommunications Act and in the European Union after the 1998 liberalization.
At the same time, technological progress has come to be seen as a fundamental driving force of economic performance. In telecommunications, plans for the introduction of advanced networks generate such high expectations about new or improved services, and acceleration of economic growth and competitiveness, that not discouraging the necessary investments should be among regulators' primary concerns.
Regulators thus need to manage a trade-o¤between the two objectives of static and dynamic effciency, which are often conflicting. The objective of the following three Chapters is to analyze this possible trade-o¤ by studying the relationship between access regulation and investments under di¤erent contexts.
