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Resumo(s)
We investigate the determinants of giving in a lab-in-the-field experiment with large stakes.
Study participants in urban Mozambique play dictator games where their counterpart is the
closest person to them outside their household. Dictators share more with counterparts when they
have the option of giving in kind (in the form of goods), compared to giving that must be in cash.
Qualitative post-experiment responses suggest that this effect is driven by a desire to control how
recipients use gifted resources. Standard economic determinants such as the rate of return to
giving and the size of the endowment also affect giving, but the effects of even large changes in
these determinants are significantly smaller than the effect of the in-kind option. Our results
support theories of giving where the utility of givers depends on the composition (not just the
level) of gift-recipient expenditures, and givers thus seek control over transferred resources.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
sharing altruism giving dictator game inter-household transfers Mozambique
