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Governance as integrity

dc.contributor.authorDa Veiga, Maria do Rosário
dc.contributor.authorMajor, Maria
dc.contributor.institutionNOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)
dc.contributor.pblEmerald Group Publishing Ltd.
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-24T23:42:21Z
dc.date.available2020-02-24T23:42:21Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.descriptionFunding text: The second author of the paper acknowledges that this work was funded by Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (UID/ECO/00124/2013 and Social Sciences Data Lab, Project 22209) by POR Lisboa (Lisboa-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences Data Lab, Project 22209) and POR Norte (Social Sciences Data Lab, Project 22209).
dc.description.abstractPurpose: Through a case study on the governance structures of the UN, the purpose of this paper is to develop a critique of Public and Private Bureaucracies Transaction Cost Economics (PPBTCE) (Williamson, 1999) as a theoretical lens to analyze internal oversight structures. Design/methodology/approach: The authors explore “probity” and “independence” transactions’ attributes through historical narrative case-based research to answer the question – Why did numerous attempts to strengthen the governance of UN internal oversight structures not relieve “probity” hazards? Findings: The analysis shows that at the UN increasing and strengthening the governance of oversight structures, i.e., incentives, did not relieve probity/ethics hazards as predicted in PPBTCE. Secretaries-General and UN General Assembly, entities charged with oversight powers, systematically trumpeted the UN Charter, breaching probity/ethics and disregarding the supervisory independence prerogative of internal oversight structures, hence failing to contribute to the “common good” and to protect the UN mission. Originality/value: This paper is the first application of PPBTCE to internal oversight transactions within an International organization context testing probity and independence attributes. The authors find that “independence” outweighs the “asset specificity” attribute whenever decisions on the governance of internal oversight arise. As far as sourcing decisions are concerned, the authority of the sovereign and the independence of the judiciary as well as quasi-judiciary transactions are not transferable attributes and, thus, cannot be contracted along with the actors’ ethics. PPBTCE should be modified to include, e.g. “virtues ethics” behavioral assumption as a transaction costs’ reduction device and explanatory framework for “probity” hazards, abandoning the opportunism behavioral assumption.en
dc.description.versionpublishersversion
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.format.extent334357
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/JPBAFM-08-2018-0086
dc.identifier.issn1096-3367
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 16430392
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 26b07e70-3398-4ecd-9309-ec8760e68390
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85077681215
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/93308
dc.identifier.urlhttps://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85077681215
dc.language.isoeng
dc.peerreviewedyes
dc.subjectEthics
dc.subjectInternal oversight
dc.subjectInternational organizations
dc.subjectPublic and Private Bureaucracies Transaction Cost Economics
dc.subjectPublic sector
dc.subjectPublic Administration
dc.subjectStrategy and Management
dc.titleGovernance as integrityen
dc.title.subtitlethe case of the internal oversight at the United Nations through the lens of public and private bureaucracies transaction cost economicsen
dc.typejournal article
degois.publication.firstPage67
degois.publication.issue1
degois.publication.lastPage91
degois.publication.titleJournal of Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management
degois.publication.volume32
dspace.entity.typePublication
rcaap.rightsopenAccess

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