Publicação
Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
| dc.contributor.author | Cabral, Luís M. B. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-10-10T15:10:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-10-10T15:10:17Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1987-11 | |
| dc.description.abstract | It is often the case in symmetric games in normal form that the only existing pure-strategy equilibria are asymmetric. If there is an asymmetric equilibrium for a model with N 'equal" players, then there are multiple equilibria, only differing on the "name" of the players 'assigned" to each one of the actions which together form an equilibrium. A natural question to ask Is, then, how to select among these equilibria. In this note, we show that in symmetric games with a large number of players, an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium can be thought of as the approximate outcome of the play of a specific symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. | |
| dc.description.version | N/A | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.citation | Cabral, Luis M. B., Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria (November, 1987). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 75 | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83874 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.peerreviewed | no | pt_PT |
| dc.publisher | Nova SBE | pt_PT |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | FEUNL Working Paper Series;75 | |
| dc.title | Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria | pt_PT |
| dc.type | working paper | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | workingPaper | pt_PT |