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Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
An individual experiences double coverage when he bene ts from more than one
health insurance plan at the same time. This paper examines the impact of such
supplementary insurance on the demand for health care services. Its novelty is
that within the context of count data modelling and without imposing restrictive
parametric assumptions, the analysis is carried out for di¤erent points of the
conditional distribution, not only for its mean location. Results indicate that
moral hazard is present across the whole outcome distribution for both public
and private second layers of health insurance coverage but with greater
magnitude in the latter group. By looking at di¤erent points we unveil that
stronger double coverage e¤ects are smaller for high levels of usage. We use
data for Portugal, taking advantage of particular features of the public and
private protection schemes on top of the statutory National Health Service. By
exploring the last Portuguese Health Survey, we were able to evaluate their
impacts on the consumption of doctor visi
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Demand for health services, Moral hazard, Count data, Quantile regression
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Editora
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
