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Resumo(s)
The first chapter of this dissertation develops a moral hazard model to study how specialized distressed investors, who privately bail out financially distressed firms, can negatively impact credit rationing ex ante. The model is then used to derive implications on value creation, capital structure, and project choice. The second chapter uses transactionlevel data from a Portuguese bank to analyze a large-scale debt forbearance program implemented
during COVID-19. The results inform on the heterogeneous effects of debt relief and how observable household characteristics can help to better design debt-relief policies. The final chapter uses a matched employee-employer dataset from Portugal to investigate how the employer capital structure can affect employee consumption and saving decisions. The effects are rationalized using a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, and suggest that financial distress and bankruptcy costs are partially shifted to employees.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Financial distress Bankruptcy Debt relief Household consumption and saving
