Predation With a Learning Curve

Cabral, Luís M. B.; Riordan, Michael H.

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/87927

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Autores

Cabral, Luís M. B.

Riordan, Michael H.

Resumo(s)

An economic definition of predation is applied to a dynamic model of duopoly competition with learning curves. It is shown that rational predation occurs in equilibrium, and below-cost pricing is neither a necessary nor a sufficient indicator of predation. A conceptual framework for antitrust analysis of predation shows that a prohibition of predation might help or harm consumer welfare depending on the parameters of the model, although the information requirements of fashioning an effective legal rule against harmful predation are formidable.

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/87927

Citação

Cabral, Luis M. B. and Riordan, Michael H., Predation With a Learning Curve (February, 1995). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 244

Editora

Nova SBE

Coleções

NSBE - Working Paper Series

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