Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
In the context of an infinitely repeated R&D-race, where firms do not only choose their research efforts but also their innovation targets, we characterize the optimal strategies of leaders and followers, and study the occurrence of leapfrogging and the persistence of leadership. A simple condition describes whether followers will want to match or leapfrog the leader, or catch up step-by-step. In particular, this choice is independent of the persistence of leadership, which is determined by the research efforts through the replacement and efficiency effects.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
R&D Innovation targets Leapfrogging Innovation hazard Stochastic Jump Differential Game
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Hoernig, Steffen, Dynamic R&D Competition With Endogenous Innovation Targets and Leapfrogging (October, 1999). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 370
