Mechanism Induced Cost Overruns

Gaspar, Vítor; Leite, António Nogueira

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/84563

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Autores

Gaspar, Vítor

Leite, António Nogueira

Resumo(s)

We develop a procurement model where given sensible rules regarding contractor selection cost overruns are expected to occur. In this model, although the sponsor has access to unbiased ex ante estimates of project costs, the selection mechanism induces an ex post downward bias as to project costs. We further investigate the relationship between signal's accuracy and the expected magnitude of the bias.

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/84563

Citação

Gaspar, Vitor and Leite, Antonio P. N., Mechanism Induced Cost Overruns (1989). FEUNL Working Paper Series No.115

Editora

Nova SBE

Coleções

NSBE - Working Paper Series

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