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Publicação
Buying the Option to say "No"
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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
We analyze a simple model of bilateral bargaining under asymmetric information where the seller of an object can not simply say "no" by default to a buyer who is supposed to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Rather, he must acquire this option before the actual bargaining process begins. This choice is observable to the buyer, and hence, the seller's pre-bargaining action might signal private information. We develop a complete characterization of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure and (strictly) mixed strategies for this game. Then the model is compared to a standard bargaining setting in terms of the realization of welfare enhancing property-right changes.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Bargaining Signalling
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Lang, Günther, Buying the Option to say "No" (December, 2000). FEUNL Working Paper Series No.397