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Publicação
Bertrand Equilibria and Sharing Rules
Autores
Hoernig, Steffen
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
We analyze how sharing rules affect Nash equilibria in Bertrand games, where the sharing of profits at ties is a decisive assumption. Necessary conditions for either positive or zero equilibrium profits are derived. Zero profit equilibria are shown to exist under weak conditions if the sharing rule is “sign-preserving”. For Bertrand markets we define the class of “expectation sharing rules”, where profits at ties are derived from some distribution of quantities. In this class the winner-take-all sharing rule is the only one that is always sign-preserving, while for each pair of demand and cost functions there may be many others.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Bertrand games Sharing rule Tie-breaking rule Sign-preserving sharing rules Expectation sharing rules
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Hoernig, Steffen, Bertrand Equilibria and Sharing Rules (March, 2005). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 468