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Publicação
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games
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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
Over the years, several formalizations of games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Mas-Colell (1984) and Khan and Sun (1999). Unlike the others, Khan and Sun (1999) also addressed the equilibrium problem of large finite games, establishing the existence of a pure strategy approximate equilibrium in sufficiently large games. This ability for their formalization to yield asymptotic results led them to argue for it as the right approach to games with a continuum of players. We challenge this view by establishing an equivalent asymptotic theorem based only on Mas-Colell’s formalization. Furthermore, we show that it is equivalent to Mas-Colell’s existence theorem. Thus, in contrast to Khan and Sun (1999), we conclude that Mas-Colell’s formalization is as good as theirs for the development of the equilibrium
theory of large finite games.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Nash Equilibrium Asymptotic Results Pure Strategies Approximate equilibria
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Carmona, Guilherme, On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (April, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 487