Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board

Amaro de Matos, João; Mergulhão, João

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82743

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Autores

Amaro de Matos, João

Mergulhão, João

Resumo(s)

We provide evidence that the presence of bankers in the board of directors reduce information asymmetry between credit markets and firms. We show that the impact of the presence of bankers on leverage is driven by firms with low level of debt. This effect is amplified the more connected the bankers are to the corporate world. Additionally the results are more pronounced for less transparent firms. Our findings suggest that the connectedness of bankers play a key role in reducing information asymmetry.

Palavras-chave

Information asymmetry Debt level Social networks Corporate boards Bankers

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82743

Citação

Amaro de Matos, João and Mergulhão, João, Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board (2015). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 597

Editora

Nova SBE

Coleções

NSBE - Working Paper Series

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