A experiência da guerra europeia no norte de África português (1508-12 e 1574-78)

Abstract

The understanding that armed conflict played a major part in shaping sixteenth century Europe is unquestionable, but there is still some reluctance accepting the hard military details as an integral part of the analysis. The multidisciplinary approaches, as crucial as they are in understanding the real scope of Renaissance war, more often than not seem to put war itself as a mere backstage scenario. This is especially true on the military analysis of the Portuguese expansion. The territorial contraction that took place during D. Joãos III’s reign, and the overwhelming defeat of Alcácer Quibir seems to demonstrate an overall decadence. What was the war of the Portuguese at that time, after all? As the centre of political power always took hand on everything that could have something to do with the practice of war, the supposed ignorance and inexperience of the King’s entourage are pointed as the main reasons of the disaster, putting the Military Revolution debate away from early modern Portugal. The North Africa was the nearest space of military confrontation to Portugal, both physically and historically, so it is the operational theater that better reflects the policies of the decision center. An expansionist movement took place twice in the geography during the sixteenth century, in the period from 1508-1514, and in the reign of D. Sebastião. Both kings made great investment in deep military reforms, especially the later on, who made a massive effort to update the Portuguese military machine. Failure ensued, and explaining the causes will be difficult and controversial, but surely the Military Revolution is a vital part of the debate.