Publicação
Os Tribunais Constitucionais na Crise
| datacite.subject.fos | Ciências Sociais::Direito | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Terrinha, Luís Heleno | |
| dc.contributor.author | Luca, Alexandre Corrêa De | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-08-21T10:45:39Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-08-21T10:45:39Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2026-05-13 | |
| dc.description.abstract | A tese investiga o impacto das crises no direito constitucional do Brasil e de Portugal, focando na atuação do Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro e do Tribunal Constitucional português. Quatro perguntas guiam a pesquisa: (1) houve jogos duros constitucionais onde disputas políticas desafiam a ordem constitucional? (2) Nos casos onde esses jogos não ocorreram, a atuação dos tribunais ajudou a evitar a escalada de conflitos? (3) Quando ocorreram, como os tribunais reagiram? E, finalmente, (4) esses jogos levaram a mudanças no arranjo constitucional? Os resultados mostram que, em Portugal, tanto na crise da dívida soberana quanto na pandemia de COVID-19, não houve evidências de que as disputas políticas tenham escalado para um autêntico jogo duro constitucional, em grande parte devido ao consenso político. No Brasil, contudo, esses jogos ocorreram durante a pandemia, com tentativas do governo Bolsonaro de centralizar o controle das medidas de combate ao vírus, e durante o impeachment de Dilma Rousseff, quando maiorias parlamentares buscaram limitar os poderes presidenciais. A tese conclui que, enquanto a atuação do Tribunal Constitucional português foi neutra e limitada, a do STF foi crucial em impedir a escalada dos conflitos durante a pandemia e teve um papel ambíguo no impeachment. No Brasil, os jogos duros resultaram em mudanças no presidencialismo de coalizão, reduzindo o poder presidencial, ao contrário de Portugal, onde a ordem constitucional permaneceu estável. | por |
| dc.description.abstract | The thesis investigates the impact of crises on constitutional law in Brazil and Portugal, focusing on the role of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court and the Portuguese Constitutional Court. Four key questions guide the research: (1) Were there constitutional hardball tactics where political disputes challenge the constitutional order? (2) In cases where such tactics did not occur, did the courts' actions help prevent the escalation of conflicts? (3) When these tactics did occur, how did the courts respond? And finally, (4) did these tactics lead to changes in the constitutional framework? The findings show that in Portugal, during both the sovereign debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, there was no evidence that political disputes escalated into genuine constitutional hardball, largely due to political consensus. In Brazil, however, these tactics were evident during the pandemic, with attempts by the Bolsonaro government to centralize control over virus containment measures, and during the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, when parliamentary majorities sought to limit presidential powers. The thesis concludes that while the Portuguese Constitutional Court's role was neutral and limited, the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court played a crucial role in preventing conflict escalation during the pandemic and had an ambiguous role during the impeachment. In Brazil, constitutional hardball resulted in changes to the coalition presidentialism, reducing presidential power, unlike in Portugal, where the constitutional order remained stable. | eng |
| dc.description.abstract | La thèse examine l'impact des crises sur le droit constitutionnel au Brésil et au Portugal, en se concentrant sur le rôle de la Cour suprême fédérale brésilienne et du Tribunal constitutionnel portugais. Quatre questions principales guident la recherche: (1) Y a-t-il eu des tactiques constitutionnelles dures où les conflits politiques défient l'ordre constitutionnel? (2) Dans les cas où ces tactiques n'ont pas eu lieu, les actions des tribunaux ont-elles aidé à prévenir l'escalade des conflits? (3) Lorsque ces tactiques ont eu lieu, comment les tribunaux ont-ils réagi? Et enfin, (4) ces tactiques ont-elles entraîné des changements dans le cadre constitutionnel? Les résultats montrent qu'au Portugal, tant pendant la crise de la dette souveraine que pendant la pandémie de COVID-19, il n'y a pas eu de preuve que les conflits politiques aient escaladé au point de devenir un véritable affrontement constitutionnel, en grande partie grâce au consensus politique. Au Brésil, en revanche, ces tactiques ont été présentes durant la pandémie, avec des tentatives du gouvernement Bolsonaro de centraliser le contrôle des mesures de lutte contre le virus, ainsi que durant la procédure de destitution de Dilma Rousseff, lorsque les majorités parlementaires ont cherché à limiter les pouvoirs présidentiels. La thèse conclut que, tandis que le rôle du Tribunal constitutionnel portugais a été neutre et limité, celui de la Cour suprême fédérale brésilienne a été crucial pour empêcher l'escalade des conflits pendant la pandémie et a joué un rôle ambigu lors de la destitution. Au Brésil, ces tactiques constitutionnelles dures ont conduit à des changements dans le présidentialisme de coalition, réduisant les pouvoirs présidentiels, contrairement au Portugal, où l'ordre constitutionnel est resté stable. | fra |
| dc.identifier.tid | 101627106 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/205617 | |
| dc.language.iso | por | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Tribunais Constitucionais | |
| dc.subject | Jogo Duro | |
| dc.subject | Brasil | |
| dc.subject | Portugal | |
| dc.subject | Crise | |
| dc.title | Os Tribunais Constitucionais na Crise | por |
| dc.title.alternative | "Jogo Duro" Constitucional em Brasil e Portugal | por |
| dc.type | doctoral thesis | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| thesis.degree.name | Doutoramento em Direito Público |