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Mechanism Induced Cost Overruns

dc.contributor.authorGaspar, Vítor
dc.contributor.authorLeite, António Nogueira
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-17T15:23:19Z
dc.date.available2019-10-17T15:23:19Z
dc.date.issued1989-05
dc.description.abstractWe develop a procurement model where given sensible rules regarding contractor selection cost overruns are expected to occur. In this model, although the sponsor has access to unbiased ex ante estimates of project costs, the selection mechanism induces an ex post downward bias as to project costs. We further investigate the relationship between signal's accuracy and the expected magnitude of the bias.pt_PT
dc.description.versionN/Apt_PT
dc.identifier.citationGaspar, Vitor and Leite, Antonio P.N., Mechanism Induced Cost Overruns (May, 1989). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 121pt_PT
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/84569
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewednopt_PT
dc.publisherNova SBEpt_PT
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFEUNL Working Paper Series;121
dc.subjectSelection Mechanismpt_PT
dc.subjectCost Overrunspt_PT
dc.titleMechanism Induced Cost Overrunspt_PT
dc.typeworking paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typeworkingPaperpt_PT

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