Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection

Carmona, Guilherme; José, Fajardo

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82983

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Autores

Carmona, Guilherme

José, Fajardo

Resumo(s)

We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches.

Palavras-chave

Common Agency Menu Games Sequential Equilibrium

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82983

Citação

Carmona, Guilherme and Fajardo, José, Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection (July, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 490

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Nova SBE

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NSBE - Working Paper Series

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Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection

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