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The Vertigo of Belief - Inside Wittgenstein´s Epistemology of Religion
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Esta tese de doutoramento procura aprofundar a ideia de Wittgenstein da injustificabilidade racional das crenças religiosas. A questão de partida que a move é a seguinte: como fazer sentido da ideia de Wittgenstein de que não temos uma justificação racional para as nossas crenças religiosas fundamentais? A tese está dividida em três capítulos, cada um focado nas diferentes dimensões da questão de partida. O primeiro
capítulo foca-se nos temas de seguimento de regras e teorias do significado, procurando ligar diferentes autores como Saul Kripke, P.M.S. Hacker ou John McDowell. A ideia fundamental a ser defendida neste capítulo prende-se com a interligação das condições de assertabilidade e condições de verdade como matriz para o seguimento de regras em comunidade. O segundo capítulo foca-se em questões epistemológicas, a partir de conceitos como verdade, objetividade, conhecimento e contexto, cruzando diferentes correntes epistemológicas contemporâneas. Pegando nos temas discutidos no primeiro capítulo, a nossa capacidade para seguir regras e obter conhecimento está intimamente ligada com as ‘dobradiças’ wittgensteinianas, com o papel do contexto para a constituição destas dobradiças e com a possibilidade de conceber dimensões da realidade como objetivas. Esta tríade é sustentada pela leitura do trabalho de autores como Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams e Markus Gabriel. O terceiro capítulo foca-se nos temas de filosofia da religião a partir do trabalho de Wittgenstein, ligando o seu pensamento com o de outros autores, tais como G.K. Chesterton,
David Hart e Roger Scruton. Neste capítulo procuro mostrar como, à luz das ideias desenvolvidas, o contexto religioso constitui um contexto objetivo em si mesmo, com categorias ontológicas e epistémicas próprias, sustentado numa vida prática específica. No final procuro mostrar como é a partir de uma leitura realista do pensamento de Wittgenstein que melhor compreendemos o sentido da sua afirmação da impossibilidade de justificar uma crença religiosa fundamental. A natureza prática e fundamentalmente diferente do ponto de
vista religioso constitui um domínio ontológico e epistemológico próprio, irredutível a qualquer explicação ou justificação científica.
This doctoral thesis seeks to deepen the meaning of Wittgenstein's idea about the rational unjustifiability of religious beliefs. The starting question that drives it is this: how can we make sense of Wittgenstein's idea that we have no rational justification for our fundamental religious beliefs? The thesis is divided into three chapters, each focusing on different dimensions of the starting question. The first chapter focuses on the themes of rule following and theories of meaning, trying to link different authors like Saul Kripke, P.M.S. Hacker or John McDowell. The fundamental idea to be defended in this chapter concerns the interconnection of assertibility conditions and truth conditions as a matrix for rule following in community. The second chapter focuses on epistemological issues, starting with concepts such as truth, objectivity, knowledge and context, crossing different contemporary epistemological currents. Picking up on the themes discussed in the first chapter, our ability to follow rules and obtain knowledge is closely linked with Wittgensteinian 'hinges', with the role of context for the constitution of these hinges and with the possibility of conceiving dimensions of reality as objective. This triad is supported by reading the work of authors such as Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams and Markus Gabriel. The third chapter focuses on the themes of philosophy of religion from the work of Wittgenstein, linking his thought with that of other authors, such as G.K. Chesterton, David Hart and Roger Scruton. In this chapter I try to show how, in the light of the ideas developed, the religious context constitutes an objective context in itself, with its own ontological and epistemic categories, sustained in a specific practical life. In the end I try to show how it is from a realist reading of Wittgenstein's thought that we better understand the meaning of his affirmation of the impossibility of justifying a fundamental religious belief. The practical and fundamentally different nature of the religious viewpoint constitutes an ontological and epistemological domain of its own, irreducible to any scientific explanation or justification.
This doctoral thesis seeks to deepen the meaning of Wittgenstein's idea about the rational unjustifiability of religious beliefs. The starting question that drives it is this: how can we make sense of Wittgenstein's idea that we have no rational justification for our fundamental religious beliefs? The thesis is divided into three chapters, each focusing on different dimensions of the starting question. The first chapter focuses on the themes of rule following and theories of meaning, trying to link different authors like Saul Kripke, P.M.S. Hacker or John McDowell. The fundamental idea to be defended in this chapter concerns the interconnection of assertibility conditions and truth conditions as a matrix for rule following in community. The second chapter focuses on epistemological issues, starting with concepts such as truth, objectivity, knowledge and context, crossing different contemporary epistemological currents. Picking up on the themes discussed in the first chapter, our ability to follow rules and obtain knowledge is closely linked with Wittgensteinian 'hinges', with the role of context for the constitution of these hinges and with the possibility of conceiving dimensions of reality as objective. This triad is supported by reading the work of authors such as Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams and Markus Gabriel. The third chapter focuses on the themes of philosophy of religion from the work of Wittgenstein, linking his thought with that of other authors, such as G.K. Chesterton, David Hart and Roger Scruton. In this chapter I try to show how, in the light of the ideas developed, the religious context constitutes an objective context in itself, with its own ontological and epistemic categories, sustained in a specific practical life. In the end I try to show how it is from a realist reading of Wittgenstein's thought that we better understand the meaning of his affirmation of the impossibility of justifying a fundamental religious belief. The practical and fundamentally different nature of the religious viewpoint constitutes an ontological and epistemological domain of its own, irreducible to any scientific explanation or justification.
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Contexto Dobradiça Objetividade Ponto de vista religioso Regras Context, Hinge Objectivity Religious point of view Rules