Publicação
Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs
| dc.contributor.author | Arvan, Lanny | |
| dc.contributor.author | Cabral, Luís M. B. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Santos, Vasco | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-21T12:28:57Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-11-21T12:28:57Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1995-03 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We generalize Farrell's (1987) idea of coordination by means of cheap talk. We show that if cheap talk is meaningful (in a specific sense) and if there is room for cooperation (namely if there exists at least one pure-strategy equilibrium Pareto superior to the default equilibrium), then cheap talk must increase the equilibrium expected payoff relative to the play of the game without pre-play communication. | pt_PT |
| dc.description.version | N/A | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.citation | Arvan, Lanny, Cabral, Luís and Santos, Vasco, Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs (March, 1995). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 255 | pt_PT |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/87939 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_PT |
| dc.peerreviewed | no | pt_PT |
| dc.publisher | Nova SBE | pt_PT |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | FEUNL Working Paper Series;255 | |
| dc.title | Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs | pt_PT |
| dc.type | working paper | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | pt_PT |
| rcaap.type | workingPaper | pt_PT |