Publicação
The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare?
| dc.contributor.author | Júlio, Paulo | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-03-13T10:55:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-03-13T10:55:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-07 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper aims at analyzing the effects of lobbying over economic growth and primarily welfare. We model explicitly the interaction between policy-makers and firms in a setup where the latter undertakes political contributions to the former in exchange for more restrictive market regulations which induce exit and enhance the profitability of the market. In a sectorial equilibrium, despite stimulating growth, lobbying restricts the market structure and reduces welfare when compared to the free-entry outcome. However, once general equilibrium considerations are taken into account, we find that lobbying may improve welfare over a welfare maximizing free-entry equilibrium, by means of an expansion in aggregate demand. This introduces a new paradigm in the literature about the effects of lobbying over economic performance. | por |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Funda cão para a Ciência e Tecnologia (BD/36542/2007), Fundação Amélia de Mello | por |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11570 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | por |
| dc.publisher | Nova SBE | por |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Nova School of Business and Economics Working Paper Series;542 | |
| dc.subject | Lobbying | por |
| dc.subject | Market structure | por |
| dc.subject | R&D investment | por |
| dc.subject | Growth | por |
| dc.subject | Welfare | por |
| dc.title | The politics of growth: Can lobbying raise growth and welfare? | por |
| dc.type | working paper | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| rcaap.rights | openAccess | por |
| rcaap.type | workingPaper | por |