Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
We study a two sector endogenous growth model with environmental
quality with two goods and two factors of production, one clean
and one dirty. Technological change creates clean or dirty innovations.
We compare the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum and
study first- and second-best policies. Optimal policy encourages research
toward clean technologies. In a second-best world, we claim
that a portfolio that includes a tax on the polluting good combined
with optimal innovation subsidy policies is less costly than increasing
the price of the polluting good alone. Moreover, a discriminating
innovation subsidy policy is preferable to a non-discriminating one.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Pollution Endogenous growth Innovation Environmental policy Laissez-faire equilibrium Optimal equilibrium Discriminating vs. non-discriminating subsidies to R&D
