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Dissuasão no ciberespaço: Um modelo para a Ciberdefesa nacional
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A atual instabilidade geopolítica, a par da revisão do edifício concetual da Defesa Nacional desencadeada pelo Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional, evidencia a necessidade de analisar o contributo das Forças Armadas para a prossecução dos interesses nacionais na vertente internacional.
A presente tese tem como objetivo propor um modelo para a ciberdefesa nacional, enquanto expressão do instrumento militar no ciberespaço, no contexto da dissuasão, procurando colmatar a sua atual inexistência. Para o efeito, parte-se de um enquadramento teórico orientado para a identificação das tendências internacionais da dissuasão no ciberespaço, analisando-se posteriormente a realidade da NATO como forma de aferir a sua aplicação, e culminando no estudo do caso português, numa lógica de transição do plano teórico para a concretização ao nível nacional.
No plano conceptual, evidencia-se que o ciberespaço se afirma como um domínio central da competição estratégica contemporânea, impondo a revisão dos modelos clássicos de dissuasão. As suas especificidades distintas do mundo físico, exigem uma agilidade constante, para efeitos de absorção, adaptação e articulação, tornando insuficiente uma abordagem baseada exclusivamente na negação ou na punição. De forma a colmatar esta insuficiência, apresenta-se uma nova proposta de dissuasão - “dissuasão situacional”. Complementarmente, nos níveis político, militar e técnico destaca-se a importância do ciberespaço para a NATO, recorrendo-se à framework DOTMLPFI e ao conceito de “operações multi-domínio”, identificando-se, contudo, algumas incongruências no Conceito Estratégico de 2022 e na taxonomia adotada em matéria de ciberdefesa e cibersegurança.
No plano empírico, tendo por base as Grandes Opções para o Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional, o estudo recorre à metodologia qualitativa “Análise Textual Discursiva”, aplicada a 31 entrevistas a especialistas, sendo uma novidade neste campo, bem como à análise comparativa de documentos estratégicos nacionais relacionados com o ciberespaço. Os resultados apontam para a necessidade de revisão da Estratégia Nacional de Ciberdefesa, nomeadamente ao nível conceptual.
A investigação assenta numa combinação de raciocínio dedutivo e indutivo, suportada por análise documental, entrevistas semiestruturadas e pelo estudo de caso da ciberdefesa. Adota uma orientação ontológica construtivista e uma perspetiva epistemológica interpretativista, no período de 2015 a 2025. No plano teórico, recorre-se ainda à teoria da cooperação de Chester Barnard (1938).
A tese conclui com a proposta de um modelo de ciberdefesa nacional estruturado em seis categorias: Cooperar, Defender, Combater, Capacitar, Comunicar e Dissuadir, sustentando que a credibilidade da dissuasão para Portugal depende, sobretudo, da resiliência, da coordenação institucional, da inovação, da cooperação internacional e da comunicação estratégica.
The current geopolitical and geoeconomic instability, together with the ongoing revision of the conceptual framework of National Defence initiated by the Strategic Concept of National Defence, highlights the need to examine the contribution of the Armed Forces to the pursuit of national interests in the international domain. This thesis proposes a model for national cyber defence as an expression of the military instrument in cyberspace, within the context of deterrence, addressing its current absence. To this end, it begins with a theoretical framework aimed at identifying international trends in cyber deterrence, followed by an analysis of NATO’s approach to assess their application, and culminating in the Portuguese case, thereby enabling a transition from the theoretical level to concrete national implementation. At the conceptual level, cyberspace is shown to have become a central domain of contemporary strategic competition, requiring a reassessment of traditional deterrence models. Its specific characteristics, distinct from the physical domain, demand continuous agility in terms of absorption, adaptation, and coordination, rendering approaches based solely on denial or punishment insufficient. To address this limitation, a new proposal is advanced: “situational deterrence”. In parallel, at the political, military, and technical levels, the relevance of cyberspace for NATO is highlighted through the use of the DOTMLPFI framework and the concept of multi-domain operations. However, inconsistencies are identified both in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and in its taxonomy concerning cyber defence and cybersecurity. Empirically, drawing on the Major Options for the Strategic Concept of National Defence, the study applies the qualitative methodology of Discursive Textual Analysis to 31 expert interviews, complemented by a comparative analysis of national strategic documents related to cyberspace. The findings point to the need to revise the National Cyber Defence Strategy, particularly at the conceptual level. The research combines deductive and inductive reasoning, supported by document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and a case study of cyber defence. It adopts a constructivist ontological stance and an interpretivist epistemological approach, covering the period from 2015 to 2025. Theoretically, it also draws on Chester Barnard’s (1938) theory of cooperation. The thesis concludes by proposing a national cyber defence model based on six categories: Cooperate, Defend, Combat, Capability, Communicate, and Deter, arguing that, in the Portuguese case, the credibility of deterrence depends primarily on resilience, institutional coordination, innovation, international cooperation, and strategic communication.
The current geopolitical and geoeconomic instability, together with the ongoing revision of the conceptual framework of National Defence initiated by the Strategic Concept of National Defence, highlights the need to examine the contribution of the Armed Forces to the pursuit of national interests in the international domain. This thesis proposes a model for national cyber defence as an expression of the military instrument in cyberspace, within the context of deterrence, addressing its current absence. To this end, it begins with a theoretical framework aimed at identifying international trends in cyber deterrence, followed by an analysis of NATO’s approach to assess their application, and culminating in the Portuguese case, thereby enabling a transition from the theoretical level to concrete national implementation. At the conceptual level, cyberspace is shown to have become a central domain of contemporary strategic competition, requiring a reassessment of traditional deterrence models. Its specific characteristics, distinct from the physical domain, demand continuous agility in terms of absorption, adaptation, and coordination, rendering approaches based solely on denial or punishment insufficient. To address this limitation, a new proposal is advanced: “situational deterrence”. In parallel, at the political, military, and technical levels, the relevance of cyberspace for NATO is highlighted through the use of the DOTMLPFI framework and the concept of multi-domain operations. However, inconsistencies are identified both in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and in its taxonomy concerning cyber defence and cybersecurity. Empirically, drawing on the Major Options for the Strategic Concept of National Defence, the study applies the qualitative methodology of Discursive Textual Analysis to 31 expert interviews, complemented by a comparative analysis of national strategic documents related to cyberspace. The findings point to the need to revise the National Cyber Defence Strategy, particularly at the conceptual level. The research combines deductive and inductive reasoning, supported by document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and a case study of cyber defence. It adopts a constructivist ontological stance and an interpretivist epistemological approach, covering the period from 2015 to 2025. Theoretically, it also draws on Chester Barnard’s (1938) theory of cooperation. The thesis concludes by proposing a national cyber defence model based on six categories: Cooperate, Defend, Combat, Capability, Communicate, and Deter, arguing that, in the Portuguese case, the credibility of deterrence depends primarily on resilience, institutional coordination, innovation, international cooperation, and strategic communication.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Ciberdefesa Dissuasão Ciberespaço Cibersegurança Capacidade