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A Gramática do Pensamento em Wittgenstein - Do Tractatus ao Big Typescript
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Investigar o conceito de pensamento nas obras filosóficas principais de Wittgenstein, até
1933, é esclarecer o que o determina e quais são as suas condições de possibilidade.
São, deste modo, também as possibilidades do pensamento filosófico que estão em
investigação. É precisamente de acordo com essas possibilidades, como veremos, que se
ergue a sua filosofia. O período considerado inclui os primeiros anos, iniciados em
1929, da designada segunda fase do pensamento filosófico de Wittgenstein. São anos de
transição, em que se analisa o que muda no seu conceito de pensamento e as suas
implicações filosóficas. Antes, o pensamento é um mistério impenetrável ao sentido,
algo que se mostra na linguagem, mas que a própria linguagem, quando tentada a falar
sobre isso, se precipita no sem-sentido. Nestes anos de transição, ele deixa de ser
impensável, passando a ser possível ao pensamento exprimir-se sobre a estrutura da sua
própria expressão. A gramática da linguagem comum sucede à gramática de uma
linguagem formal. Da possibilidade ontológica da verdade como condição necessária à
possibilidade da expressão do pensamento segue-se a verdade ou falsidade da expressão
do pensamento decidida pelo sentido dessa mesma expressão. Já a metafísica e a
realidade psíquica permanecem impensáveis. O pensamento metafísico é patológico e a
atividade filosófica dedica-se à sua terapia. A filosofia é, para Wittgenstein, uma
atividade que nos reconduz à realidade, que faz com que deixemos que as coisas sejam
como elas são. Este estudo está organizado em função das suas obras principais e da
respetiva cronologia no período considerado. Assim, a primeira parte é dedicada ao
Tratado Lógico-Filosófico, a segunda parte às Observações Filosóficas e a terceira
parte, a mais longa, ao The Big Typescript. Outras obras de menor dimensão, deste
período, são igualmente analisadas, como sejam os Cadernos 1914-1916, “Algumas
Observações Sobre a Forma Lógica”, Conferência Sobre Ética e a primeira parte das
Observações Sobre o “Ramo Dourado” de Frazer. O estudo termina com uma
conclusão final onde, além de se destacarem os principais resultados desta investigação,
se estabelecem pontes com algumas das suas obras filosóficas posteriores.
To investigate the concept of thought in Wittgenstein's major philosophical works until 1933 is to clarify what determines it and what its conditions of possibility are. So, too, are the possibilities of philosophical thought that are under investigation. It is precisely in accordance with these possibilities, as we shall see, that his philosophy is raised. The period considered includes the early years, beginning in 1929, of Wittgenstein's designated second phase of philosophical thought. These are years of transition in which we analyse what changes in his concept of thought and its philosophical implications. Previously, thought was a mystery impenetrable to meaning, something that shows itself in language, but that language itself, when tempted to talk about it, rushes into meaninglessness. In these years of transition, it is no longer unthinkable, but it is possible for thought to express itself on the structure of its own expression. The grammar of common language takes the place of the grammar of formal language. The ontological possibility of truth as a necessary condition for the possibility of the expression of thought is followed by the truth or falsity of the expression of thought decided by the meaning of that expression. Metaphysics and psychic reality, however, remain unthinkable. Metaphysical thinking is pathological and philosophical activity is devoted to its therapy. Philosophy is, for Wittgenstein, an activity that brings us back to reality, that makes us let things be as they are. This study is organized according to its main works and their chronology during the period considered. Thus, the first part is devoted to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the second part to Philosophical Remarks, and the third, the longest part, to The Big Typescript. Other smaller works of this period are also analysed, such as Notebooks 1914-1916, “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, Lecture on Ethics, and the first part of the “Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough”. The study ends with a final conclusion where, in addition to highlighting the main results of this investigation, bridges are established with some of his later philosophical works.
To investigate the concept of thought in Wittgenstein's major philosophical works until 1933 is to clarify what determines it and what its conditions of possibility are. So, too, are the possibilities of philosophical thought that are under investigation. It is precisely in accordance with these possibilities, as we shall see, that his philosophy is raised. The period considered includes the early years, beginning in 1929, of Wittgenstein's designated second phase of philosophical thought. These are years of transition in which we analyse what changes in his concept of thought and its philosophical implications. Previously, thought was a mystery impenetrable to meaning, something that shows itself in language, but that language itself, when tempted to talk about it, rushes into meaninglessness. In these years of transition, it is no longer unthinkable, but it is possible for thought to express itself on the structure of its own expression. The grammar of common language takes the place of the grammar of formal language. The ontological possibility of truth as a necessary condition for the possibility of the expression of thought is followed by the truth or falsity of the expression of thought decided by the meaning of that expression. Metaphysics and psychic reality, however, remain unthinkable. Metaphysical thinking is pathological and philosophical activity is devoted to its therapy. Philosophy is, for Wittgenstein, an activity that brings us back to reality, that makes us let things be as they are. This study is organized according to its main works and their chronology during the period considered. Thus, the first part is devoted to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the second part to Philosophical Remarks, and the third, the longest part, to The Big Typescript. Other smaller works of this period are also analysed, such as Notebooks 1914-1916, “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, Lecture on Ethics, and the first part of the “Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough”. The study ends with a final conclusion where, in addition to highlighting the main results of this investigation, bridges are established with some of his later philosophical works.
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Palavras-chave
Filosofia Linguagem Metafísica Gramática Pensamento Verdade Grammar Language Metaphysics Philosophy Thought Truth